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RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-Commerce Clause-Validity of Statute Regulating
Interstate Transportation of Convict-Made Goods-An Act of Congress
forbade the transportation in interstate commerce of goods made by convict
labor into any state where such goods were intended to be received or sold in
violation of its laws, and in all cases required explanatory labeling of packages
containing such goods.' Plaintiff tendered unlabeled convict-made goods to the
defendant carrier for shipment into states the laws of which prohibited the sale
of such goods therein. Upon the defendant's refusal to accept the shipments, in
obedience to the Act, action was brought for a mandatory injunction on the
ground that the statute was unconstitutional. Held, that the Act is a valid regulation of interstate commerce under the Constitution. 2 Kentucky Whip & Collar
Co. v. illinois C. R. R., U. S. Sup. Ct., (1937) 4 U. S. L. WEEK 485. 3
The instant decision constitutes a most liberal interpretation of the power
of Congress to regulate interstate commerce for police purposes. 4 Inasmuch as
the goods regulated are physically harmless and of no specified description, and
since the only evil to be remedied lies in the subversive economic effect of competition between unpaid or underpaid convict labor and properly compensated
free labor,5 the Act differs from the unconstitutional Child-Labor Law 6 solely
in the fact that the present regulation does not positively forbid all interstate
transportation of the goods, but merely prohibits such transportation into those
states which themselves forbid the sale thereof. Although the professed purpose
of the Act is thus only to aid state law enforcement, and not to foist a policy
upon the states, 7 and although regulation of this sort is necessary to prevent the
operation of the "original package" doctrine from destroying the effectiveness
i. The Ashurst-Sumners Act, 49 STAT. 494 (I935), 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 61-65 (Supp. 1936).
2. U. S. CoxsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3. The lower court decisions of the same case are to be found in 84 F. (2d) 168 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1936), and in 12 F. Supp. 37 (W. D. Ky. 1935).
4. Although the Court cites an impressive array of cases involving the use of a federal
police power, the entire doctrine is a comparatively new one, having arisen only in the present
century. For a discussion of the earlier cases cited by the Court, see Note (1917) 3o HARv.
L. REv. 491.
5. The existence of a true economic evil in the sale of convict-made goods is shown by
the fact that a preponderant number of states have laws preventing such sale and that Congress has prohibited the importation of such goods into the United States [46 STAT. 689
(1930), ig U. S. C. A. § 1307 (Supp. 1936) ], as well as the sale of them to the public in competition with private enterprise when made by convicts imprisoned under federal law [46
STAT. 391 (1930), 18 U. S. C. A. §744c (Supp. 1936)]. See Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S.
431, 439 (1936) ; Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois C. R. R., 84 F. (2d) 168, 169 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1936).
6. 39 STAT. 675 (1916). In Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 25, (1918), this Act,
which forbade all interstate transportation of goods manufactured with the aid of child labor,
was held unconstitutional as a regulation of the production of the goods involved. It was
there said, "It is further contended that . . . authority . . . may be exerted to control
interstate . . . shipment of child-made goods because of the effect of the circulation of
such goods in other States where the evil of this class of labor has been . . . more vigorously restrained than in the State of production." Id. at 273. But power so to deal with the
problem was denied. For a penetrating criticism of Hammer v. Dagenhartsee GAviT, THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE (1932) § 108 (c).
7. Instant case at 487, 488. See also the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals in 84
F. (2d) 268, 27o (C. C. A. 6th, 1936).
(529)
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of the state laws, 8 it must be remembered that in actual fact the major part of

the country-wide market for convict-made goods is taken away, 9 and to some
extent the production of such goods in states which do not forbid their sale is
thus curtailed and a policy is forced upon them. The Court attempted to focus
attention ' 0 on the Acts regulating the interstate transportation of liquor," from
which both this and an earlier federal statute on the subject 2 were obviously
drawn, as a valid analogy; but such analogy is not entirely correct since the fact
remains that in this Act, as in the Child-Labor Law, only a special class of labor
is affected, while the regulation extends to no specified kind of goods, but rather
to all kinds of goods made by the class affected. Nevertheless, the liquor and
convict-goods laws remain the only instances where Congress has successfully
legislated to prevent the channels of interstate commerce from being used to
impede the carrying out of a valid policy undertaken by only part of the states.

Constitutional Law-Constitutionality of the Unemployment Compensation Tax Imposed by the Social Security Act-The petitioner, a stockholder in the respondent railroad company, sought to enjoin the respondent from
making payment to the United States Collector of Internal Revenue as required
by Title IX of the Social Security Act, alleging that Title IX is unconstitutional.
Held, that Title IX is constitutional, because it levies a valid excise within the taxing powers of Congress, falling within the requirements of uniformity and providing for the general welfare. Davis v. Boston & Maine R. R., 17 F. Supp. 97 (D.
Mass. 1936), cert. denied, U. S. Sup. Ct., (i937) 4 U. S. L. WEEK 477. 1
8. For the development and nature of this doctrine by which a sale in the original package is considered still a part of the interstate commerce, although the transportation has in
fact terminated, see GAviT, TEE COMMERCE CLAUSE (1932) § 72. It was for the same purpose
that an earlier federal law on the subject, the Hawes-Cooper Act, was formulated. 45 STAT.
1084 (1929), 4g U. S. C. A. § 6o (Supp. 1936). Involving quite a different constitutional
problem, the Act was upheld in Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431 (1936), but its validity has
been vigorously attacked. See Davis, The Hawes-Cooper Act Unconstitutional (1930) 23
LAWYER & BANKER 296; Legis. (1931) 44 HARV. L. REv. 846 (also giving a brief history of
all state laws on the subject).
9. This is true since more than half the states have laws prohibiting the sale of convictmade goods therein. See supra note 5.
1o. Instant case at 487.
ii. The Wilson Act, 26 STAT. 313 (18go), 27 U. S. C. A. § 121 (Supp. 1936), upheld in
In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 (1891), and the Webb-Kenyon Act, 37 STAT. 699 (1913), 27 U.
S. C. A. § 122 (Supp. 1936), upheld in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western M. Ry., 242 U. S. 311
(1917), correspond almost exactly in wording With the Hawes-Cooper and Ashurst-Sumners
Acts respectively. For a discussion of the then new Webb-Kenyon Act, see Note (1917) 17
COL. L. REV. 144. GAvWT, TiE COMMERCE CLAUSE (1932) § IIi, traces the history of this
legislation and treats the cases under it.
12. 45 STAT. 1084 (1929), 49 U. S. C. A. § 6o (Supp. 1936), discussed supra note 8. This
law merely allowed the state jurisdiction over the goods to attach upon their delivery within
the state, regardless of whether they remained in the original package or not, hence preventing
a sale in the original package from frustrating the state law. While not unconstitutional, the
law did not interfere with the right to receive, possess, and use the goods though sale was forbidden, and it was to close this loophole that the present Act was drafted, preventing even the
transportation of the goods to, and their receipt in, the specified class of states. Similar considerations led to the drafting of the second act on the interstate transportation of liquor. See
Clark Distilling Co. v. Western M. Ry., 242 U. S. 311, 323, 324 (1917).
i. Application was made for certiorari prior to review by the Circuit Court of Appeals,
in an attempt to get a prompt adjudication by the Supreme Court. Certiorari having been
denied, the case is now pending in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
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The conclusion that the tax imposed by Title IX 2 on employers of eight or
more persons is an excise tax on the act of employing is well supported.8 The
tax, being indirect within the meaning of the Constitution 4 is subject only to the
requirement of uniformity. 5 A tax is uniform within the constitutional meaning
of the word when it imposes the same standards of liability thereto in all sections of the United States.( Therefore, although a federal tax falls on only one7
class of persons, it is uniform if all the persons in that class are subject to it.
Furthermore, the only taxes that have been held invalid because of arbitrary
classification are state taxes." Thus it is apparent that there is nothing about
the operation of the tax itself which exceeds the broad taxing power of Congress.
However, the purpose of the tax and the method of achieving that purpose are
grounds upon which the Supreme Court might deny its constitutionality. Title
IX does not set up a federal unemployment insurance agency, but in effect it
forces the states to set up state unemployment insurance agencies by permitting
taxpayers to credit against 9o% of the federal tax, taxes paid to the states under
approved unemployment insurance plans." Florida v. Mellon'0 stands for the
proposition that there is nothing unconstitutional per se in a federal tax which
forces states to enact legislation. However, Title IX not only forces the states
to legislate but dictates the standards of such legislation, with a Social Security
Board to determine whether the state enactments fulfill those requirements. 1
Thus Title IX might well be held to transcend the doctrine of Floridav. Mellon
because of the method used to accomplish its purpose. 2 On the other hand, the
method might be termed a plan of federal-state cooperation rather than one of
coercion,'" thus obviating the objection of federal dictation of state laws. However, the broad meaning given to coercion in the A. A. A. decision 1 4 would seem
to make this interpretation highly improbable. The court in the instant case
took the view that the purpose of the tax was to raise revenue.' 5 However, it
would hardly be necessary to look behind the face of the Act to determine that
its actual purpose is to provide a nationwide system of unemployment insurFor an excellent
2. 42 STAT. 639 (1935), 42 U. S. C. A. § Iioi et seq. (Supp. 1936).
analysis of this and other sections of the Act, see Armstrong, The Federal Social Security
Act and Its ConstitutionalAspects (936) 24 CALIF. L. REv. 247, 248-258; cf. Legis. (1937)
85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 511.
3. The following are typical of the many varied taxes upheld as excises: Patton v. Brady,
184 U. S. 6o8 (19o2) (tax on manufacturing and selling) ; Billings v. United States, 232 U.
S. 261 (194) (tax on using foreign built yachts) ; Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U. S. I24
(1929) (tax on making gifts inter vivos).
4. See i COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § io8.

s. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. i.
6. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107 (191o) ; Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R.,
240

U. S. I (1915).

7. See i COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § iii.
8. See Armstrong, supra note 2, at 259.
9. 42 STAT. 639 (935), 42 U. S. C. A. § 1102 (Supp. 1936) ; see Note
L. RE:v. 90, 93.
80. 273 U. S. 12 (1927). The case involved the Revenue Act of 1926,
credit of the amount of inheritance taxes paid to the state up to 8o% of the
II. 42 STAT. 640 (935), 42 U. S. C. A. § 1io3 (Supp. 1936) ; see Note
L. RFv. 90, 95.
12.

(1936)

20 MARQ.

which provided a
federal tax.
(1936) 20 MAQ.

See Legis. (1936) 24 Gao. L. J. 665, 683.

13. See Corwin, National-State Cooperation-ItsPresent Possibilities (937)

L. J_ 599, 622.
14. See United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. I, 74 (936),
15. See instant case at io1.

46 YALE

84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 547.
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ance. 8 The dogma is that Congress may not do indirectly what it may not do
directly.17 It may not, under the guise of exercising a constitutional power such
as taxation, circuitously regulate activity which it has no power directly to control. The real solution of the problem of the constitutionality of Title IX seems
then to hinge on the power of Congress to create a federal unemployment insurance agency. It is probable that such a federal project would fall on the ground
that it invaded the powers reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.1 8
It is indeed difficult to see under what enumerated power delegated to Congress
by the Constitution unemployment insurance could be upheld. However, if the
Supreme Court should give the substantive effect to the welfare clause1 9 indicated by a dictum in the A. A. A. decision,2 0 the purpose sought to be effected
by the tax levied by Title IX could be found to be within the powers of Congress. 21

Constitutional Law-Due Process-Power of State to Prohibit Peaceable Assembly Under Auspices of Communist Party-Defendant was convicted under a criminal syndicalism statute 1 for assisting in the conduct of a
meeting held under the auspices of the Communist Party. No violence or unlawful methods were advocated at the meeting, but evidence showed that the
Communist doctrines embraced such methods. Held, that the statute, as applied, violated the "due process" clause of the Federal Constitution 2 which guarantees the rights of free speech and of peaceable assembly. De Jonge v. Oregon,
57 Sup. Ct. 255 (1937).3
This case represents another important step in the extension of the "due
process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to safeguard from state encroachment the rights protected from Congressional impairment by the first
eight amendments. Starting with a dictum in Gitlow v. New York, 4 the doctrine that freedom of speech and of the press are so protected has become well
entrenched. 5 Although the Court once held that the guaranty of "due process"
did not necessarily extend to all of the rights set forth in the "Bill of Rights"
24 GEo. L. 3. 665, 679.
17. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20 (1922) ; Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44
(1922) ; see United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 69 (1936).
But see McCray v. United
States, 295 U. S. 27, 59 (904) ; United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86, 93 (191).
18. The following discussions of the constitutionality of the old age pension plan, a federal project, would be pertinent to the constitutionality of a federal unemployment insurance
plan: Armstrong, supra note 2, at 266 (constitutional) ; Denby, The Case Against the Constitutionality of the Social Security Act (1936) 3 LAw & CONTEmP. PROD. 3,5,329 (unconstitutional).
ig. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. i.
20. See United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. I, 66 (1936), 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 547.
21. See Shulman, The Case for the Constitutionality of the Social Security Act (0936)
3 LAW & CONTEmP. PROB. 298, 313.

16. See Legis. (1936)

1. I ORE. CODE ANN. (930)
§§ 14-3,110 to 14-3,112, as amended by Ore. Laws 1933, c.
459. "Criminal syndicalism" is defined therein as the "doctrine which advocates crime, physical violence, sabotage or any unlawful acts or methods as a means of accomplishing or effecting industrial or political change or revolution."
2. U. S. CONST. Amend. XIV.
3. Reversing State v. De Jonge, 252 Ore. 325, 51 P. (2d) 674 (1935), 24 GEO. L. J. 744

(1936).
4. 268 U. S. 652, 666 (925).
5. Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927) ; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380 (2927);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (931)
("red flag" law) ; Near v. Minnesota, 283
U. S. 697 (93)
(press) ; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (2936) (press).
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7
amendments, 6 a dictum in the recent case of Grosjean v. American Press Co.
the
"due
seemed to show an intention to inject these amendments in toto into
process" clause. 8 In the instant case the right of peaceable assembly is placed
for the first time under its protection, not, however, because of the prohibition
contained in the First Amendment, which applies only to Congress, 9 but upon
the theory that, like freedom of speech and of the press, it is a "fundamental"
right.' 0 Thus, although there is no express rejection of the Grosjean dictum,
the Court seems to limit the extension of "due process" to those rights which are
"fundamental". This limitation by the Court of its own power to review state
legislation again throws open the question as to the boundaries of the "due
process" clause in the sphere covered by the "Bill of Rights", for it is far from
well established which of those rights are "fundamental". The increasing prevalence of repressive legislation in recent years 11 points to the desirability of clearly
defined limitations upon the power of the states to impair civil liberties. In
criminal syndicalism cases involving rights of free speech and press the Court
has tended to uphold state acts unless they appeared too arbitrary, 2 having rejected in such cases the oft-repeated contention of Justice Holmes that printed
or spoken words should not be prohibited unless they create a "clear and present
danger". 13 The Court did not in the instant case expressly apply either of these
tests, but merely held that peaceful meetings where nothing unlawful is advocated
cannot be declared criminal. It is not indicated what the result would have been
had one of the speakers held forth upon the usual Communist theme of the
inevitable future necessity of violence. Thus the extent to which the Oregon
statute and other similar statutes 14 may constitutionally be applied to limit peaceable assembly is still unascertained.

Constitutional Law-Obligation of Contracts Not Impaired by North
Carolina Mortgage Deficiency Judgment Act-A North Carolina statute
provided that when the mortgagee or holder of an obligation secured by real
estate, who has authority to sell on default, purchases directly or indirectly the
mortgaged premises at such sale, a deficiency judgment is to be entered for only
the difference between the fair value of the premises and the amount of the
mortgage debt.' Plaintiff, payee of a promissory note secured by real estate,
caused the property to be sold in accordance with the terms of the deed of trust
6. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (9o8).
7. 297 U. S. 233, 243-244 (1936), 49 HARv. L. RE~V. 9-8,
8. See Note (1936) 4 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 347, 354.

20 MINN. L. REv.

671.

9. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the rights of the people peace-

ably to assemble ....
io. See instant case at 26o; see also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 552
(1875).
ii. For a thorough discussion of legislation of this sort see Legis. (1936) 84 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 390.
12. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925) ; Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 337
(1927).
13. Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (1918) ; dissenting opinions: Abrams v.
United States, 250 U. S. 616, 624 (1919) ; Pierce v. United States, 252 U. S. 239, 253 (1920) ;
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 672 (1925) ; concurring opinion: Whitney v. California,
274 U. S. 357, 372 (1927).

14. The Nebraska statute goes so far as to punish the mere providing of rooms to be used
for such forbidden meetings. NEB. ComP. STAT. (1929) § 28-817. For a compilation of the
statutes on this subject see Legis. (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 390, 392-393.
I. N. C. CODE (Michie, 1935) § 2593 (d). The Act allows the mortgagor to set off the
fair value of the premises in a suit brought by the mortgagee for a deficiency judgment.
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and became the purchaser at the sale. In a suit brought for the difference between the sale price and the amount of the debt, judgment was rendered for the
mortgagor, the jury having found that the fair value of the mortgaged premises
was equal to the amount of the mortgage debt. Held, affirmed on the ground
that the statute did not violate the federal constitutional restriction against impairing the obligation of contracts.2 Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v.
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., U. S. Sup. Ct., (1937) 4 U. S. L. WEK 6o7.
In validating the Act, the Court invoked the familiar doctrine that laws
which do not operate on the substantive rights of parties to a contract but merely
affect or modify remedies given to enforce those rights do not impair the obligation of contracts within the meaning of the Constitution.3 The Court reasoned
that since the statute did not apply to foreclosure sales in equity, it did not
impair substantive rights by modifying an alternative remedy allowed by state
law. But it is to be noted that in foreclosure proceedings, under North Carolina
law, the court could refuse to confirm a sale if the highest bid was inadequate; 4
whereas, previous to the statute, the court had no such power over a sale by a
mortgagee according to the terms of the trust deed. 5 Hence, to the extent that
the Court held that there was no impairment of contract rights in limiting the
broader remedy in the latter situation, the instant case would seem contrary to
Bldg.
Supreme Court in Beaver County
the recent decision of the Pennsylvania
7
6
& Loan Ass'n v. Winowich, criticized in a recent issue of the REvIEw.

Constitutional Law-Validity of the Establishment of Minimum
Wages by Means of a Regulation of Unfair Competition-Under the authority granted him by a state statute,' the Governor of Wisconsin promulgated a
code of fair competition for the intra-state business of the barber industry, which
included a minimum wage requirement. The defendant, a barber, having paid
his employees less than the set standard, an action was instituted to compel him
to cease and desist his violation of the code. Held (Fowler, Nelson, and Fairchild, JJ. dissenting), that the establishment of minimum wages in order to prevent unfair competition does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution.2 State ex rel. Attorney General v. Fasekas, 269 N. W. 700
(Wis. 1936). A similar regulation of the painting, paper hanging, and decorating industry, made under the same authority, was also held valid. State ex rel.
Attorney Generalv. Noyes, 269 N. W. 710 (Wis. 1936).
2.

U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § lO.

3. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 200 (U. S. 1819) ; Von Hoffman v. City
of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 553-554 (U. S. 1866) ; Feller, Moratory Legislation : A Comparative
Study (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. io6i, 1O69; Bunn, The Impairment of Contracts: Mortgage
and Insurance Moratoria (1933) 1 U. OF Ca. L. REv. 249, 251.
4. See instant case at 6o7; Woltz v. Asheville Safe Deposit Co., 206 N. C. 239, 241, 173
S. E. 587, 589 (1934).
5. Instant case at 607.
6. 323 Pa. 483, 187 Atl. 481 (1936).
7. (1936) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 114. The whole tenor of the Court's opinion in the instant case seems contrary to that of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See, especially, instant
case at 6o8.
i. Wisconsin Laws 1933, c. no, amended by Wisconsin Laws 1935, c. 182.
Although the court did not rule that the minimum wage legislation was constitutional,
because the case was decided upon an error in the procedure of taking the appeal, the dissenting opinion, and the greater part of the majority opinion was devoted to the judges' viewpoints on the question of this' particular method of wage regulation.
2.
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The instant cases are the most recent decisions by state courts upholding
minimum wage legislation 8 despite the fact that, in earlier rulings upon similar
enactments, 4 the Supreme Court has unequivocally denied to both the state and
federal governments the power to regulate wages.5 Although the attempt to
circumvent these decisions has assumed a new guise, it is improbable that the
mere declaration of a different purpose for the legislation will render it constitutional. However, the case of Morehead v. Tipaldo 8 has indicated a possibility
in the direction 7 of a future relaxation of the harsh, unqualified rule against
such enactments.8 And if this tendency be extended, the instant case is sufficiently distinguishable to enable the Court to affirm these decisions without
openly rejecting its prior adjudications, for under the Wisconsin Act, unlike all
other minimum wage statutes, the Governor establishes a scale of wages as an
incident of his undoubted power to eliminate methods of unfair competition.9
Furthermore, if it be found as a fact that a minimum wage is essential to the
establishment of fair trade practices, then, since the prevention of unfair competition vitally affects the public interest, the maintenance of minimum wage
standards would be a valid exercise of the state's power to intercede in any
situation in which the public is sufficiently interested. 10 However, it is difficult
to find any connection between the superior ability of an employer to bargain
with his employees, and the violation of principles of fair competition.,' And
unless there is some such relationship, the establishment of minimum wages
under this procedure is invalid because the Governor has thereby exceeded his
authority to make regulations necessary for codes of fair competition.

Contracts-Effect Upon Previously Formed Illegal Agreements of
Statute Legalizing Such Agreements-Plaintiff, assignee of the claim,
brought suit for the purchase price of liquor which had been sold and delivered
to defendant before the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. Held, that the
Volstead Act had, in such situations, merely afforded the defense of illegality to
3. Heretofore, the states which enacted minimum wage laws have done so in the hope
that the Supreme Court would reject the broad language of the Adkins case, or in the belief
that a statement in the preamble of the act that the law was an exercise of their police power
would render it constitutional. 8 WAsH. Rav. STAT. (Remington, 193) tit. 5o, § 7624Y2 ,
Parish v. West Coast Hotel Co., 55 P. (2d) 1O83 (Wash. 1936), 85 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 117;
N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, Supp. 1935) c. 32, §§ 550-567, Morehead v. People ex rel. Tipaldo,
56 Sup. Ct. 918 (1936). See Minimum Wage Laws (1936) 26 Am. LAB. LEG. REV. 84.
4. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (923), 7, U. OF PA.L. Ray. 36o; Morehead v. People ex rel. Tipaldo, 56 Sup. Ct. 1918 (1936), pet. for rehearingdenied, 4 U. S. L.
WEEK 121; see (1936) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 613.
5. The Adkins case held unconstitutional a federal minimum wage law, and the Morehead
case held unconstitutional a state minimum wage law.
6. 56 Sup. Ct. 918 (1936).
7. This possibility is indicated in the Court's refusal to consider whether the Adkins case
should be overruled unless the appellant so requested. Instead, the Court limited its opinion to
ruling that the Adkins case applied to state as well as to federal legislation.
8. Mr. Justice Holmes, in his dissenting opinion in the Adkins case, pointed out that the
question decided by the majority was: "Whether Congress can establish minimum rates of
wages . . . or whether . . . Congress had no power to meddle with the matter at all,"
[261 U. S. 525, 567 (1923)], and the majority said in answer to this question that, ". . . the
authority to fix hours of labor cannot be exercised. . . ." 261 U. S. 525, 554 (1923).
q. In re Petition of State ex rel. Attorney General, 220 Wis. 25, 264 N. W. 633 (1936).
Io. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 0934), 82 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 619; Goldsmith &
Winkle, Price Fixing: From Nebbia to Guffey (1936) 31 ILL. L. Ray. 179.
ii. A regulation of the wages of labor is a regulation of the cost of one of the elements
which goes into manufacture. Therefore, if wages are considered a trade practice, then the
price paid for raw materials, too, should be considered subject to control because it is as intimately associated with fair trade practices.
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actions brought on the alleged contracts, which defense was no longer available,
so that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. Lido Capital Corp. v. Eskelsen,
N. Y. Sup. Ct., N. Y. L. J., Dec. 22, 1936, p. 2335, col. 6.
Recognizing the existence of a divergency of judicial attitudes on the question of whether an agreement, illegal at its inception, is rendered enforceable by
a legislative enactment legalizing the formation of such agreements,' the instant
court purported both to apply firmly established New York law and also to follow the Restatement. As a matter of fact, it did neither; for there are conflicting New York decisions 2 and the Restatement positively advocates a contrary
ruling.3 The present ruling is based upon the theory that an illegal bargain is
not enforceable because both parties have been guilty of unlawful conduct in
entering into the agreement, and that it is against the policy of the courts to
lend aid to either wrongdoer; but that, after the status of the law has so changed
that such conduct is no longer to be considered wrongful, the policy impelling
the courts to withhold their aid no longer exists. However, the prevailing rule
denies recovery in such cases. 4 The orthodox rationalization of this view is
that there never was a contract because the defendant had been given no valid
consideration for his promise; consequently, a later change in the law could not
make something of this transaction which was, in the eyes of the law, a nullity.
Since our contract law is fundamentally based upon the theory that a promisor
i.Unquestionably, of course, a statute with a retroactive saving clause can validate such
bargains.

RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS

(1932)

§ 6o,

quoted infra note 3.

The instant court

admitted the absence of any such saving clause in the Twenty-first Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
2. The court cited New York decisions enunciating this rule but apparently overlooked

two decisions which are contra. The decisions sanctioning recovery on the contract: Bloch v.

Frankfort Distillery, 247 App. Div. 864 (1st Dep't, 1936) (a liquor contract; decided without
opinion) ; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9 (1857) (constantly cited in the other decisions but
which interpreted the statute in question as being retroactive; see id. at 152-154, 254) ; Central Bank v. Empire Stone Dressing Co., 26 Barb. 23 (Sup. Ct. 1857) ; Washburn v. Frank-

lin, 35 Barb. 599 (Sup. Ct. 1861) ; Hoppock v. Stone, 49 Barb. 524 (Sup. Ct. 1867) ; Bock v.
City of New York, 31 Misc. 55 (Sup. Ct 19oo).
The two decisions propounding the opposite view, which are not alluded to in the other

decisions, are: Bailey v. Mogg, 4 Denio 6o (Sup. Ct. 1847) ; New York, etc. R. R. v. Van
Horn, 57 N. Y. 473 (1874).

It was said in 1913, in a very able note on this topic, that New York law seemed reasonably well settled that the repeal of a statute making a contract illegal takes away the defense
of illegality, as though the statute had never existed.
3. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932)

§ 6og.

ANN.

CAs. I913C, 1398, at 14o6.

The instant court cites § 598 for the proposition that the general statement to the effect
that illegal contracts are void is inaccurate and that the true basis for the denial of recovery
is that the law denies relief to a party founding his cause of action on his own immoral or
illegal act. This appears in the Comment to that section which itself states: "A party to an

illegal bargain can neither recover damages for breach thereof nor, by rescinding the bargain,

recover the performance that he has rendered thereunder or its value, except as stated in

§§ 599-609." The latter sections state exceptions to the general rule laid down in § 598, such
as: when one party is justifiably ignorant of the illegality of the bargain and the other is not
(§ 599), when the illegality is slight (§ 6oo), when the illegal provision is unessential (§ 6o3),
etc. The statement in the Comment to § 598, it would seem, is an explanation of the theoretical
basis for these exceptions.
§ 6o9 reads: "A bargain that is illegal when formed does not become legal . . . (b) by
reason of a change of law, except where the Legislature manifests an intention to validate the
bargain."
4. Ludlow v. Hardy, 38 Mich. 69o (1878) (promise to pay for illegally delivered liquor
was re-expressed after the repeal of the statute making it illegal) ; Schaun v. Brandt, 116
Md. 56o, 82 Atl. 551 (1911) ; Wood v. Imperial Irrig. Dist., 216 Cal. 748, 17 P. (2d) 128
(1932), 46 HA~v. L. REv. 1340 (1933) ("consideration" having passed, the promise was reexpressed after repeal of the statute). Contra: Ewell v. Daggs, io8 U. S.143 (1883).
It is to be noted that, according to the majority view, promisor's repetition of the promise
after the law has been changed so that such a bargain would form a contract is of no consequence.
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is not legally bound by his promise unless some valid consideration was given
as the price of the promise 5and since an illegal act or promise is not, aside from
those rare cases in which exceptions are made in order to prevent great injustice, 6
valid consideration, 7 it seems manifest that this latter view is the proper judicial
analysis of such transactions.

Corporation Law-Constitutionality of Amendment to Certificate Canceling Accrued Undeclared Dividends and Made Subsequent to Purchase of
Cumulative Preferred Shares-Plaintiff held second preferred shares in the
defendant corporation on which dividends had begun to accumulate in 193o. In
1927, after the issuance of the shares and their acquisition by the plaintiff, the
Delaware Corporation Laws were amended to confer upon the majority of shareholders of any corporation the power to alter the certificate of incorporation by
changing ".

. . the preferences, or relative, participating, optional, or other

special rights of the shares, or the qualifications, limitations, or restrictions of
such rights .... " I In 1935, when the accumulated dividends amounted to
$21.25 per share, the articles of association were amended over the plaintiff's
objection, so as to cancel the accrued dividends and convert the second preferred
shares into common shares. Dividends were then declared on all except the
second preferred shares which, because of the objection of the holders thereof,
had not been converted. The plaintiff sued to recover the accumulated dividends
on his shares. Held, that the amendment to the articles of incorporation was void
in so far as it purported to deprive the plaintiff of his right to dividends accrued
up to that time, because such deprivation of vested rights would be unconstitutional.2 Keller v. Wilson & Co., Sup. Ct. Del., November 1O, 1936.
The Morris case 3 in 1923 decided that as soon as the agreed dividend period
had elapsed there was a "vested right" to its ultimate payment as against those
who had agreed to its payment, that it was "a present property interest", and
that consequently such a dividend could not be canceled. The Delaware Corporation Law was subsequently amended, 4 but in 1929 the federal court, in a
case involving this amended statute, held that the elimination of sinking fund
provisions for the benefit of preferred shareholders, where such amendment was
not authorized by the corporation law at the time the company was incorporated,
5. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932)

§ 19; 1 WILIrSoN, CONTRACTS (1936)

6. These exceptional situations are specified in
609. See supra note 3.
7. Hazelton v. Sheckells,

§ 99.

RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932)

203 U. S. 71 (19o6); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932)

§§ 599§ 8o.

35 Del. Laws 1927, c. 85, § io, amending DEL.REV. CODE (1915) c. 65, § 26. DL. REV.
c. 65, § 82 reserves the right to the legislature to alter, amend, or repeal. On
the matter of legislative substitution of the rule of majority control for the rule of unanimous
consent, see Dodd, Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters (1927)
I.

CODE (915)

75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 723, 728.
2. The court, without referring to particular provisions, said that vested property rights
were secured by the Federal and State Constitutions. This was undoubtedly intended to refer
to the "due process" clauses of both constitutions. U. S. CoNST. Amend. XIV; DEL. CoNsT.
Art. 1, § 7.
3. Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., i4 Del. Ch. 136, 122 At. 696 (923), 8
MINN. L. REv. 617 (1924) (cited by error under the name of Hardenv. EasternStates Public
Service Co.).
4. See supra note I.
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was an impairment of the obligation of contracts. However, the Davis case 6
earlier held that because of the public interest in the continued existence of corporations, an amendment to the certificate which changed dividend preferences
was valid, even though it affected the purely private contract between shareholders inter se. And a federal court in 1933 s held that the same amended statute
was broad enough to validate the abrogation of dividends on preferred shares
by means of the issuance of new prior preferred shares. The result in the instant
case was reached by reasoning that the right to accumulated dividends was a
"vested property right", yet it is apparent that only those rights are "vested"
which are protected, so that this test is meaningless, since it assumes its conclusion. However, this decision shows that the Delaware court is not prepared,
even under the broad terms of the Delaware law, to allow the absolute destruction of the rights of dissenting minority shareholders to accumulated dividends.
It is submitted that the validity of an amendment of this kind should be determined by deciding whether or not it is necessary to the protection of third persons, as, for example, creditors whose rights stand upon a higher footing than
that of the group which is to be prejudiced by the action.

Criminal Procedure-Common Law Right of Attorney General to
Supersede District Attorney-Under a statute authorizing the Attorney
General to appoint a special attorney in criminal cases when requested to do so
by the president judge,' the Attorney General appointed himself as prosecutor
and procured the indictment of certain individuals for murder. The latter then
began quo warranto proceedings, challenging the right of the Attorney General
to designate himself as special attorney. Held, that the Attorney General rightfully appointed himself special attorney under the statute, 2 and that, aside from
the statute, he possessed common law powers to prepare and try criminal cases,
although it was necessary to supersede the District Attorney in so doing. Commonwealth exv rel. Minerd v. Margiotti; Commonwealth ex rel. Reilly v. Same,
188 Atl. 524 (Pa. 1936).

That the Attorney General had extensive powers in criminal prosecutions
under the English common law is conceded, 8 but it is held in a number of American states that the Attorney General today has no powers derived from the
5. Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F. (2d) 533 (D. R. I. 1929). Accord:
Lord v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 194 N. Y. 212, 87 N. E. 443 (19o9). See Dodd, supra
note I, at 746.
6. Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 Atl. 654 (1928), cited by
BERLE & MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION & PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933) 2M1, as proceeding
"on some vague theory that the State's interest in fostering business allowed the grant of
rights to an intra-corporate group to change the agreement as against their associates which
the state itself probably did not have."
7. See Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 144, 122 Atl. 696, 70o
(1923).

8. Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., 65 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933), 28 ILL. L.
REV. 422.

I. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 71, § 297.

The court stated that the Attorney General's designation of himself as special prosecutor under the statute was not necessary in view of his broad common law powers, and that
the statute did not curtail those powers but merely provided a manner for their exercise. See
2.

instant case at 530, 531.

3. See People v. Miner, 2 Lans. 396, 398 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1868) ; De Long, Powers and
Duties of the State Attorney-General in Criminal Prosecution (934) 25 J.CRIm. L. 358,
363-365.
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common law but only those given him by statute.' In other jurisdictions it is
held that where a statute grants to the District Attorney powers formerly exercised by the Attorney General under the English common law those powers are
deemed taken away from the Attorney General," and it is consequently declared
that the Attorney General may not supersede the District Attorney in the exercise
of those powers expressly granted to the latter. 6 Other courts, however, have
recognized the doctrine of "implied common law powers",7 whereby the Attorney
General may supersede the local prosecutor virtually at will. In Pennsylvania,
prior to the instant case, it had been established that the Legislature had the
power to provide by statute for situations in which the District Attorney might
be displaced," but whether the Attorney General retained all his powers under
the common law was not settled, though his right of "general supervision" over
9
The instant case
a District Attorney's performance of his duties was admitted.
decided that the Attorney General did retain those powers.' 0 It has been argued
that, from a practical point of view, an attempt by an Attorney General to conmight result
trol a District Attorney's preparation and trial of a criminal case
in friction between the two officials, "buck passing", and delay. 1 But as the2
activities of the modern criminal, no longer localized, have many ramifications,'
a central prosecuting authority is very essential, and this decision, in fostering
the development of such an authority, is to be approved.

Criminal Procedure-Constitutionality of the New Jersey Alternate
Juror Act-The New Jersey Alternate Juror Act provides in substance that,
in a criminal trial, at the discretion of the trial judge, a jury not to exceed fourteen members may be empaneled to sit and hear the cause; that, if it be necessary,
one or two may be excused; and that from those remaining after the charge of
the court, twelve shall be chosen by lot to render the verdict.' Defendants, con4. State v. Snyder, 172 Wis. 415, 179 N. W. 579 (192o) ; see Julian v. State, 122 Ind. 68,

72, 23 N. E. 690, 692 (i8go) ; Cosson v. Bradshaw, i6o Iowa 296, 302, 141 N. W. io62, 1O64
(1913). The New Mexico Supreme Court declared that the doctrine of implied common law

powers of the Attorney General is based upon the fact of the existence of the office prior to
a definition of its powers, and that where the statute creating the office defines its duties, the
holder of the office has no common law powers. See State v. Davidson, 33 N. M. 664, 667,
275 Pac. 373, 375 (929).
5. State v. Seattle Gas & Electric Co., 28 Wash. 488, 68 Pac. 946 (I9O2) ; State v. Ehrlick, 65 W. Va. 700, 64 S. E. 935 (19o9).
6. See State v. Ehrlick, 65 W. Va. 7oo, 7o2, 64 S. E. 935, 936 (19o9).
7. Kansas v. Finch, 128 Kan. 665, 280 Pac. 91O (1929) ; State ex rel. Young v. Robinson,
1o1 Minn. 277, 112 N. W. 269 (1907) ; Gibson v. Kay, 68 Ore. 589, 137 Pac. 864 (1914).
An early case, often cited to support the proposition that the Attorney General retained
common law powers, was a New York Supreme Court decision, wherein it was stated: "As
the powers of the attorney general, were not conferred by statute, a grant by statute of the
same or other powers, would not operate to deprive him of those belonging to the office at
common law, unless the statute, either expressly, or by reasonable intendment, forbade the
exercise of powers not thus expressly conferred." People v. Miner, 2 Lans. 396, 399 (Sup.
Ct. i868). This theory was ignored by the Appellate Division in the case of Ward
Baking Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 2o5 App. Div. 723, 2oo N. Y. Supp. 865 (3d
Dep't, 1923), but recently found strong support in the case of People v. Tru-Sport Pub. Co.,
291 N. Y. Supp. 449 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
8. See Commonwealth v. Lehman, 309 Pa. 486, 492, 164 AtI. 526, 528 (1932).
But cf.
9. See Commonwealth v. Lehman, 309 Pa. 486, 493, 164 AtI. 526, 528 (932).
Snyder's Case, 301 Pa. 276, 289, 152 Atl. 33, 37 (1930).
1o. Instant case at 530.
ii. See State v. Ehrlick, 65 W. Va. 700, 703, 64 S. E. 935, 936 (19o9).
12. See People v. Tru-Sport Pub. Co., 291 N. Y. Supp. 449, 461 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
I. N. J. Laws 1935, c. 287, §§ 1, 2, 3.
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victed of murder in the first degree by a jury so chosen,2 contend that the statute is unconstitutional. Held (by a nine to six vote), that the statute did not
contravene the constitutional provision that "the right of trial by jury shall

remain inviolate ....
"
State v. Dolbow and Driscoll, N. J. Ct. of Err. &
App., February 2, 1937.
It is well settled that the phrase "trial by jury" means a trial as understood
and applied at common law.5 Beyond all doubt, the petit jury at common law
consisted of twelve men 1 whose functions included not only the determination
of the verdict, but also the hearing of the evidence. 7 Under the statute in question, whereas twelve jurors render the verdict, fourteen hear all or part of the
evidence. Since it has been held that a body of less than twelve is not a common law jury," it would seem that to allow more than twelve to exercise the
function of hearing the evidence is repugnant to the constitutional provision
guaranteeing a jury trial as at common law. In reaching the opposite result, the
majority 9 of the court reasoned that the statute, though different in form, corresponded in substance with those whose constitutionality has been upheld in
other jurisdictions. 10 However, with the single exception of Michigan," where
the constitutional provision differs from that in New Jersey,12 these other jurisdictions provide for the empaneling of only twelve jurors and make additional
provisions for alternates, 8 so that under these enactments, only twelve men
2. No necessity for any substitution arose during the trial, and two of the fourteen originally chosen took no part in the rendition of the verdict
3. N. J. CoNsT. Art. I, par. 7.
4. On Feb. 10, 1937, the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals granted a stay of execution pending the determination of the United States Supreme Court on defendants' application for a writ of certiorari. Phila. Evening Public Ledger, Feb. 10, 1937, P. 21, col. 4.
s. Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 288 (193o).
6. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343, 350 (i898).
7. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. I, 13 (i899) ; Opinion of the Justices, 41 N. H.
550, 55 (i86o) ; Lamb v. Lane, 4 Ohio St. 167, 177 (I854)- See 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMIENTARIES (Isth ed. 189o)
365; I HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (I800) 33.
8. Rasmussen v. United States, I97 U. S. 516 (I9o5) ; see Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S.
343 (i898).
9. The dissenting opinion attacked the Act on the sole ground that the power given
therein to the court to discharge jurors from the box for any reason which in its opinion
justified the excusal was too broad, and the point as to whether the fact that fourteen heard
the evidence violated the constitutional provision here in question was not treated.
1o. People v. Peete, 54 Cal. App. 333, 202 Pac. 5I (1921) ; People v. Howard, 211 Cal.
322, 295 Pac. 333 (930) ; People v. Mitchell, 266 N. Y. I5, 193 N. E. 445 (934) ; State v.
Dalton, 206 N. C. 507, 174 S. E. 422 (1934).
U. 3 MIcH. ComP. LAWS (1929) § i73II. The instant statute is worded practically the
same as this Michigan Act.
X2. The Michigan Constitution provides: "In every criminal prosecution, the accused shall
have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury. . . " MicH. CoNsT. Art.
II, § ig. It is to be noted that this does not require, as does the New Jersey Constitution, that
trial by jury remain inviolate.
13. Statutes in most jurisdictions are patterned after the form presented by the American
Law Institute. See CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Am. Law Inst. 193o) § 285. This provides in substance that in a criminal case, after the regular jury is sworn and empaneled,
alternates be drawn, to sit as jurors only if and when, for stated reasons, a regular juror is

withdrawn. This provision is found in substance in the following states: ARIz. REV. CODE
(Strucnkmeyer, 1928) § 5041; CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering, 193) § 1089; I IDAHO CODE ANN.
(1932) tit. 19, § 1804; Neb. Laws 1933, c. 38; N. Y. CODE OF CRIX. PRO. (Cahill, Supp.
1936) § 358-a; 5 NEV. Comp. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) § 10957; OHIo CODE ANN. (Throckmorton's Baldwin, 1934) § 1431-I; 1 ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) tit. 13, §§ 913-915; I S. D. Comy.
LAws (1929) § 4867-A; UTAH REV. STAT. ANN. (1933) tit. 48, § o-6; Vt. Laws 1935, 65; 4
WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1931) tit. 13, §:2137-I; Wyo. Ray. STAT. ANN. (193')
Art. 3, § 61-3oi.

The Federal Congress has enacted a substantially similar statute. 47
28 U. S. C. A. § 417-a (Supp. x936).
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comprise the jury, as at common law, and not fourteen, as under the New Jersey
law. Therefore, despite the wholesome effect of the statute in facilitating the
administration of the criminal law by preventing undue delay and needless expense, it would seem that the instant Act clearly violates the constitutional provision guaranteeing the right of trial by a common law jury.
Insurance-Lower Dividends to Holders of Policies Having Disability
Benefits Not Discrimination-The plaintiff's life insurance policy provided
for the payment of a total annual premium which included an extra premium
for disability benefits. In accordance with the "contribution" method, the defendant, a mutual life insurance company, distributed the divisible surplus of the
company to the policyholders in the proportion in which they had contributed
thereto. Since 1931, the company had paid less dividends to the holders of policies with disability benefits, on the ground that the premiums received for life
insurance had contributed to the surplus, while the extra amount received for
disability benefits had been less than the cost of furnishing those benefits, and,
therefore, had in fact reduced the surplus.1 Plaintiff contended that this practice
was in 2 violation of a statute that required dividends to be apportioned
"equitably",
and was contrary to a statute barring discrimination.3 Held
(Crane, C. J. and Finch, J., dissenting), that this apportionment of the divisible
surplus was not inequitable or discriminatory. Rhine v. New York Life Ins. Co...
N. Y. Ct. App., (1936) 4 U. S. L. WEEK 536.
It seems well settled that the surplus of a mutual life insurance company
belongs equitably to the policyholders in the proportion in which they contributed to it.4 Since in the instant case the plaintiff contributed less to the surplus
than the holder of a straight life insurance policy, the majority of the court was
of the opinion that it was "equitable" that less dividends should be paid to him
and that after the apportionment has been made, the courts will not interfere
unless there has been bad faith, or wilful neglect, or abuse of discretion.5 The
dissenting opinion 6 was based on the ground that a payment of an additional
amount was being exacted from the policyholders with disability benefits by
deducting that amount from the dividends on the life insurance policy, thus
amounting to either a breach of contract or a violation of the statutes. The
Pennsylvania's statute differs only in that it is applicable to both civil and criminal trials.
2 CoLo. ANN. STAT. (Courtright's

PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 17, § 1153. So also:
Mills, 193o) § 4269a; N. M. Laws 1935, p. 6o.

ix.
The plaintiff's annual premium of $27.34 for life insurance resulted in an average
excess payment of $7.67 annually over the cost of furnishing life insurance, thus contributing
"$30.67" (sic) to the divisible surplus of the company from 1931 to z934, while the annual
premium of $2.96 for disability benefits resulted in an annual deficit of $2.27, and thus over
the same period depleted the divisible surplus $9.o8.
2. N. Y. Coxs. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 30, § 83.
3. N. Y. CoNs. LAwS (Cahill, 1930) c. 30, § 89, which provides: "No life insurance corporation doing business in this State shall make or permit any discrimination between individuals of the same class or of equal expectation of life, in the amount or payment or return
of premiums or rates charged . . . or in the dividends or any benefits payable thereon ......
For a collection of prohibitory statutes and cases involving them, see 3 CoucHr, INsURANCE (1929) §§ 584, 585.
4. United States Life Ins. Co. v. Spinks, 126 Ky. 405, 96 S.W. 889 (1907), writ of error
dismissed, 209 U. S.539 (i9o8) ; Zinn. v. Germantown Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co., 132 Wis. 86,
ii N. W. 1107 (907) ; see Miller v. New York Life Ins. Co., 179 Ky.246, 253, 200 S. W.
482, 486 (1918).
5.Greeff v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., i6o N. Y. i9,54 N. E. 712 (899).
6. The dissenting opinion was erroneously reported as the opinion of the court in (937)
4 U. S. L. WEEK 546.
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fallacy of this view is that it attempts to divide the policy into two contracts,
which cannot be done since the stipulation for disability benefits is completely
dependent upon the provision for life insurance. Moreover, the dissenting
judges, although professing to acknowledge the "contribution" method of distributing the divisible surplus, in reality disregard it to reach their conclusion.
The effect of adopting the minority view would be that policy holders with
disability benefits would actually pay less than the cost of insurance and to
would be required
meet the deficit, a minority of the defendant's policyholders
7
to pay more than the cost of insurance furnished them. Such a result would
seem contrary to the purpose of the mutual plan of life insurance-to furnish
to the policyholders insurance at actual cost. However, the majority of the
court, in the last paragraph of its opinion, states that other insurance companies still apportion dividends equally between policyholders with and those
without disability benefits, and that both methods are within the range of discretion accorded to the companies in distributing their surplus. It is submitted
that this conclusion is illogical, since the arguments indicating the equitableness
of the defendant's system of apportionment of dividends clearly demonstrate
that the method approved by the minority of the court is inequitable.

Taxation--"First In First Out" Rule for Identifying Shares in Computing Gains from Stock Sales for Income Tax Purposes-In 1928 petitioner
owned 73oo shares of common stock, received as a bonus upon the acquisition of
preferred stock. Later, by virtue of his ownership of the common stock, he received and exercised stock rights, purchasing 36,500 shares of common stock
at $6 a share, or a total cost of $219,ooo. After he had sold 2600 shares of
the bonus stock and 1200 of the shares purchased under the above rights, the
remaining shares were converted into street certificates, incapable of identification. A controversy then arose over the method of ascertaining the acquisition
cost of 5000 shares subsequently sold for $ioo,ooo, as a step in computing the
taxable profit from the transaction. Petitioner contended that the "average"
method should be used, whereby the 7300 shares of bonus stock to which no cost
is given 1 and the 36,500 shares acquired under the stock rights would be grouped
together, resulting in an average cost of $5.00 a share and a total acquisition
cost of $25,000, leaving a taxable profit of $75,o0o. The Commissioner, on the
other hand, ruled that the "first in first out" rule applied, resulting in 4700
shares of bonus stock at no cost and 300 shares of the later acquired stock at
$6.00 a share, a total acquisition cost of $i8OO, leaving a taxable profit of $98,200.
Held, that the "first in first out" rule was applicable, since the shares were
of different cost bases and incapable of identification. Keeler v,. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 86 F. (2d) 265 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936).
The "first in first out" rule is applied to determine the acquisition cost of
shares sold where there have been purchases of shares at different costs and
such a commingling of the stock that the shares sold are not identifiable as those
acquired in a particular transaction; in such instances the shares first acquired are
presumed to be the first to be sold.2 While averaging of the costs of the entire
7. Of the 2,6ooooo outstanding policies of the defendant company, about i,ooo,ooo provide
life insurance only, while 1,6ooooo provide in addition disability benefits.
i. The preferred stock had been sold and the entire cost thereof applied against the sale
price. Under U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 22 (a) -8 such an action appears unwarranted, but it
was approved by the Commissioner. Instant case at 265.
2. U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 22 (a) -8; C. C. H. 1937 Fed. Tax Guide Serv. 522.
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mass of shares has occasionally been permitted," the "first in first out rule", although admittedly arbitrary, is preferred.' The petitioner based his argument that
the cost of the bonus stock and the cost of the stock purchased with subscription
rights should be averaged 5 on the proposition, recognized by the court,8 that
stock purchased with subscription rights is acquired at a cost equivalent to the
sum of the money paid therefor and the value of the subscription rights.7 Yet
it is evident that a distinction must be made between apportionment of cost for
the purpose of ascertaining the true cost of subscription rights stock, and averaging to ascertain the acquisition cost of an entire group of commingled shares.
Since in the instant case the bonus stock by virtue of which the petitioner received the subscription rights was of no cost,8 it can hardly be argued that any
cost could be apportioned to the subscription rights, and no reason appears for
averaging the costs of the two lots of stock merely because one of the lots consists of subscription rights stock. It is obvious that before the "first in first
out" rule may be applied, the acquisition cost of each lot of shares must be determined, and for that purpose only does the distinction between shares acquired
under subscription rights and other shares become material.
3. Ayer v. Blair, 25 F. (2d) 534 (App. D. C. 1928) (purchase of stock followed by exercise of subscription rights) ; V. J.Bulleit, 3 B. T. A. 631 (1926) (part of shares acquired
through exercise of stock rights) ; C. C. H. i937 Fed. Tax Guide Serv. 11522.
4. 351 C. C. H. Fed. Tax Serv. 1f68.o32. Although in view of the accelerating tax rates
it seems more equitable to permit distribution of the cost over the entire mass of shares, the
"first in first out" rule has been held reasonable and binding. Skinner v. Eaton, 45 F. (2d)
568 (C. C. A. 2d, 193o) ; Commissioner v. Merchants' & Manufacturers' Fire Ins. Co., 72 F.
(:2d) 408 (C. C. A. 3d, x934); see Perkins v. United States, 12 F. Supp. 481, 488 (Ct. Cl.

'935).

5. The argument is based on Miles v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 259 U. S.247 (1922),
yet that case is clearly applicable solely to the sale of unexercised subscription rights.
6. Instant case at 266.
7. See Todd v. Commissioner, 72 F. (2d) 998, 999 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934) to the effect that
stock subscription rights are obtained with part of the original capital investment. See also
Perkins v. United States, 12 F. Supp. 481 (Ct. Cl. i935) for a discussion of the Miles case
(supra note 5)and a situation comparable to the instant case.
8. See mtpranote i.

